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New IRP Proposed Decision Allocates 6 GW Across California Load-Serving Entities

Administrative Law Judge Fitch issued a proposed decision that, if adopted, would require California load-serving entities to procure additional clean reliability resources to address forecasted system needs in the 2029–2032 period.

The PD orders 2,000 MW of net qualifying capacity online by June 1, 2030, and an additional 4,000 MW by June 1, 2032, with no more than half of each tranche met by storage. The PD also transmits updated base and sensitivity portfolios to the CAISO for use in its 2026–2027 Transmission Planning Process.

The procurement finding is based on updated Integrated Energy Policy Report load forecasts, reliability modeling using SERVM, and the risk of delayed long-lead-time resources. Eligible resources must follow the Mid-Term Reliability framework and be new, zero-emitting and/or RPS-eligible, with limited credit for repowering only to the extent of incremental capacity added.

The PD does not impose a separate energy-procurement mandate, relying instead on ELCC-based capacity requirements and existing RPS and Resource Adequacy programs.

  • An accompanying attachment allocates the 6,000 MW NQC obligation across investor-owned utilities, Community Choice Aggregators, and aggregated Electric Service Providers based on adjusted 2026 load shares (see table below).
  • The largest shares fall on PG&E and SCE bundled service, followed by major CCAs such as Clean Power Alliance, East Bay Community Energy, and San Diego Community Power. ESP obligations are shown only in aggregate and will be conveyed confidentially to individual providers.

Comments are due February 3. The earliest the CPUC will consider this item is February 26.

Procurement Obligations by Load Serving Entity
Proposed Decision — Attachment A (R.25-06-019)
Load Serving Entity Type 2026 Load
(GWh)
Adj. Share 2030
(MW NQC)
2032
(MW NQC)
Total
(MW NQC)
Pacific Gas and Electric (bundled) IOU 5,144 17.3% 347 694 1,041
PG&E Direct Access (aggregated)* ESP 11,393 4.1% 82 164 245
Clean Power San Francisco CCA 3,394 1.7% 34 68 103
East Bay Community Energy CCA 9,432 4.7% 95 190 285
King City Community Power CCA 36 0.0% 0.4 1 1
Marin Clean Energy CCA 5,966 3.0% 60 120 180
Central Coast Community Energy CCA 5,791 2.9% 58 117 175
Peninsula Clean Energy Authority CCA 3,831 1.9% 39 77 116
Pioneer Community Energy CCA 1,793 0.9% 18 36 54
Redwood Coast Energy Authority CCA 634 0.3% 6 13 19
San Jose Clean Energy CCA 4,543 2.3% 46 91 137
Silicon Valley Clean Energy CCA 4,132 2.1% 42 83 125
Sonoma Clean Power Authority CCA 2,236 1.1% 23 45 68
Valley Clean Energy Alliance CCA 724 0.4% 7 15 22
Southern California Edison (bundled) IOU 51,858 35.8% 716 1,431 2,147
SCE Direct Access (aggregated)* ESP 12,003 4.3% 86 172 259
Apple Valley Choice Energy CCA 250 0.1% 3 5 8
City of Pomona CCA 431 0.2% 4 9 13
Clean Power Alliance of Southern California CCA 11,166 5.6% 112 225 337
Desert Community Energy CCA 369 0.2% 4 7 11
Lancaster Clean Energy CCA 618 0.3% 6 12 19
Orange County Power Authority CCA 2,275 1.1% 23 46 69
Energy for Palmdale's Independent Choice CCA 497 0.3% 5 10 15
Pico Rivera Innovative Municipal Energy CCA 218 0.1% 2 4 7
Rancho Mirage Energy Authority CCA 286 0.1% 3 6 9
San Jacinto Power CCA 172 0.1% 2 3 5
Santa Barbara Clean Energy CCA 347 0.2% 3 7 10
San Diego Gas & Electric (bundled) IOU 2,658 1.8% 37 73 110
SDG&E Direct Access (aggregated)* ESP 3,942 1.4% 28 57 85
Clean Energy Alliance CCA 2,492 1.3% 25 50 75
San Diego Community Power CCA 8,340 4.2% 84 168 252
TOTAL 176,972 100% 2,000 4,000 6,000
*Note: Procurement obligations for electric service providers (ESPs) are presented in aggregate. Individual ESP obligations remain confidential and will be conveyed to each ESP within two weeks of adoption.

INSTANT ANALYSIS: On resource eligibility, the PD excludes fossil resources, limits repowering to incremental capacity only, and permits energy-only resources solely when co-located with fully deliverable storage. The 50% storage cap is the central policy choice: it constrains over-reliance on storage and indirectly drives additional energy procurement without reopening the Renewables Portfolio Standard or imposing a separate energy mandate.

Why the PD matters for CRI readers: it establishes the next reliability obligation after Mid-Term Reliability, shapes procurement behavior through 2032, and feeds directly into the CAISO's transmission approvals with cost-recovery implications. The PD also creates a narrow window for projects to secure remaining federal incentives, increasing near-term procurement pressure even as the Reliable and Clean Power Procurement Program remains under development.