> ## Content Index > Fetch the complete content index at: https://www.calregulatory.com/llms.txt > Use this file to discover other available public pages before exploring further. # June 11 CPUC Voting Meeting Results: Commission Makes SoCalGas Shareholders Pay for Safety Fixes - URL: https://www.calregulatory.com/june-11-cpuc-voting-meeting-results-commission-makes-socalgas-shareholders-pay-for-safety-fixes/ - Published: 2026-06-12T04:25:35.000Z - Updated: 2026-06-12T04:25:35.000Z - Author: MC - Tags: Cost Allocation Mechanism, EPRM, Effective Planning Reserve Margin, PURPA, Renewable Market Adjusting Tariff, ReMAT, ERRA, DAC-GT, Disadvantaged Communities Green Tariff, Community Solar Green Tariff, Public Purpose Program Surcharge, DGStats, Resolution E-5457, Resolution G-3621 At its June 11 [voting meeting](https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M608/K056/608056639.pdf?ref=calregulatory.com), the CPUC approved the following items. - A revised safety culture plan submitted by SoCalGas, paid for by shareholders. - A $267.9 million utility-owned storage project for SDG&E. - A limited shared renewables program. - Updated prices for the Renewable Market Adjusting Tariff program. - The 2026 annual fee structure for registered Core Transport Agents. --- ### UTILITY SAFETY A [decision](https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M608/K379/608379820.pdf?ref=calregulatory.com) approves SoCalGas's "Revised Safety Culture Improvement Plan" as a foundation for implementation, while explicitly declining to find the plan's specific interventions adequate or effective. The CPUC's decision finds substantial improvement over SoCalGas's earlier submission but requires refinement in five areas: - Integrating security into the safety framework; - Strengthening contractor integration; - Improving resource allocation through "Learning Teams"; - Expanding speak-up mechanisms beyond occupational safety; and - Providing intervention-level metrics in quarterly compliance reports. Sempra must remain part of a consolidated plan. Rate recovery is denied for all plan costs (development, implementation, and future iterations), which will be paid by shareholders. **DAIS DISCUSSION**: Commissioners supported the decision while stressing that approval of the plan is not approval of SoCalGas's safety culture. - **Commissioner Darcie Houck** described the revised plan as a starting point, not an endpoint, and emphasized that the CPUC will retain close oversight through quarterly compliance reports until the next safety culture assessment in 2029\. She gave credit to SoCalGas for producing "a substantial improvement" on its previous plan but explicitly noted that "ratepayers will not be paying the cost of developing, implementing or revising the plan." - **Commissioner Karen Douglas** said safety culture improvement must be demonstrated through implementation, reporting, and measurable outcomes over time. - **Commissioner Christine Harada** drew on her aerospace background, saying safety in that industry meant making sure things did not "go kaboom in the wrong way." She said safety is not proven by polished reports, dashboards, or lists of completed activities, but by changes in behavior, priorities, incentives, escalation, management discipline, accountability, and how SoCalGas allocates resources and responds to employees and contractors who raise concerns. **INSTANT ANALYSIS**: The CPUC is letting SoCalGas move forward because the revised plan is better and the proceeding has already outlasted the reassessment timeline the company would have faced under R.21-10-001\. The CPUC retains full authority to press on security, contractors, resource allocation, speak-up culture, Sempra oversight, and reporting. Cost recovery is the decision's most consequential outcome. Shareholders must fund all of this work until the next safety culture assessment clears the company. The logic is that these costs arose from SoCalGas's own organizational failures, and ratepayers should not pay to correct them. Commissioner Houck tied that outcome to the circumstances that led to the investigation and California's affordability crisis, while Commissioner Harada said customers should not be asked to pay for the company to correct deficiencies in its own safety culture. --- ### UTILITY-OWNED GENERATION [Resolution E-5467](https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M608/K379/608379816.pdf?ref=calregulatory.com) approves SDG&E's Membership Interest Purchase Agreement to acquire [Westside Canal Phase 2a](https://ceqanet.lci.ca.gov/2020040122/4?ref=calregulatory.com) from [RWE](https://www.rwe.com/en/?ref=calregulatory.com) for **$267.9 million**, with RWE retained for operations and maintenance under a 10-year services agreement. The project is a **119 MW**, four-hour lithium-ion storage facility in Imperial Valley. It came online in December 2024 and would be owned by SDG&E, with costs recovered through the Cost Allocation Mechanism (CAM) to all benefitting customers. SDG&E sought approval under the CPUC's summer reliability and Effective Planning Reserve Margin (EPRM) framework. The resolution rejects protests from the Independent Energy Producers (IEP), CalCCA, and Cal Advocates. - IEP argued the solicitation excluded independent developers and violated the Commission's competitive market first policy. - CalCCA argued SDG&E exceeded its 120-220 MW EPRM range and that only 11.4 MW of the project should flow to CAM. - Cal Advocates argued the project provides no incremental reliability benefit (RWE is already selling RA from it on a merchant basis) and that the net market value does not justify the acquisition cost. Resolution E-5467 finds SDG&E's procurement consistent with prior summer-reliability decisions, the cost competitive against other approved projects and RFO offers, and the "meet and exceed" language from [D.21-12-015](https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M428/K821/428821475.PDF?ref=calregulatory.com) still operative through [D.25-06-048](https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M571/K237/571237404.PDF?ref=calregulatory.com), meaning EPRM ranges are not caps. On deliverability, the project has interim status for 2025 and 2026 but will not reach Full Capacity Deliverability Status until transmission upgrades complete, currently expected in 2034\. The resolution accepts the risk that interim deliverability may not be available in future years. It cites price reductions, RWE penalty provisions, continued CAISO market participation, and quarterly CAM Procurement Review Group reporting as mitigation. **DAIS DISCUSSION**: Commissioners approved the item 5-0, but their discussion was more guarded than the vote count suggests. A representative from Energy Division framed the project as statewide reliability support rather than a strict SDG&E-only need, noting that EPRM procurement by one IOU supports the system-wide objective and that the system has not generally met the minimum EPRM targets. Staff also emphasized that utility ownership changes the market behavior of the asset: SDG&E must bid under least-cost dispatch rules, with revenues returned to customers, while a merchant owner would not face the same bidding constraints. **Commissioner Matthew Baker** said he viewed the project as the weakest of three utility-owned battery projects before the CPUC and would have preferred more time to examine operational issues. He credited the price reduction and the relative cost position of the asset, but also acknowledged the force of the protests: - SDG&E’s specific incremental EPRM need may be only about 11 MW; - SDG&E is long on Resource Adequacy; - The battery likely would remain in service under RWE; and - Full deliverability remains unresolved until 2034 unless operational changes, such as an eight-hour configuration, address the issue. Baker nevertheless supported the resolution, saying he would be nervous letting the opportunity pass. **President John Reynolds** also supported the item, emphasizing the multi-year review process, independent evaluator oversight, multiple rounds of negotiation, and Energy Division’s cost review against comparable projects. He described planning reserve margins as an insurance policy against emergencies, while acknowledging significant remaining uncertainty over the project’s deliverability and pointing to the required SDG&E updates to the procurement review group as an ongoing check. **INSTANT ANALYSIS:** The CPUC is blessing SDG&E's use of emergency-reliability authority to pull a fully operational merchant-adjacent storage asset into utility ownership and spread $267.9 million across all benefitting customers through CAM. However, this is not an unqualified endorsement. Commissioner Baker accepted the deal despite calling it the weakest of the utility-owned battery cases and recognizing the core protest arguments on need, merchant operation, and deliverability. The deliverability problem is the main ratepayer risk. The project has interim deliverability now, but full deliverability is not expected until 2034, and the CPUC is relying on price concessions, penalty provisions, market participation and quarterly reporting rather than a firm RA-value guarantee. The approval therefore expands utility-owned storage under the summer-reliability framework while leaving a significant portion of the long-term RA value question unresolved. --- ### SHARED RENEWABLES A [decision](https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M608/K372/608372079.PDF?ref=calregulatory.com) implements the California Shared Renewables Portfolio in a form far more limited than community solar advocates sought. A **$33 million** state appropriation reverted to the General Fund in June 2025, and the EPA terminated California's [Solar for All](https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/industries-and-topics/electrical-energy/demand-side-management/customer-generation/state-of-california-solar-for-all-program?ref=calregulatory.com) award in August 2025, eliminating the external funding that a 2024 decision ([D.24-05-065](https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M533/K188/533188781.PDF?ref=calregulatory.com)) assumed would make the program workable. The investor-owned utilities must file Tier 2 advice letters within 90 days proposing Community Renewable Energy tariffs built on the [Renewable Market Adjusting Tariff](https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/industries-and-topics/electrical-energy/electric-power-procurement/rps/rps-procurement-programs/renewable-market-adjusting-tariff?ref=calregulatory.com), but compensation cannot exceed [PURPA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public%5FUtility%5FRegulatory%5FPolicies%5FAct?ref=calregulatory.com) avoided costs and nonparticipating customers cannot fund adders of any kind. If external funding later materializes, each IOU must file a separate Tier 3 advice letter covering the implementation plan, marketing, bill credits, and balancing account details. If no developer executes a ReMAT Power Purchase Agreement within two years of the Tier 2 disposal date, each IOU may discontinue its program via Tier 1 advice letter. The decision also: - Consolidates Green Tariff oversight into procurement review and [ERRA](https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/industries-and-topics/electrical-energy/electric-costs/what-is-an-energy-resource-recovery-account-proceeding?ref=calregulatory.com) cost proceedings; - Eliminates annual forums and advisory board meetings; - Moves stranded Green Tariff costs into ERRA; - Shifts the [Disadvantaged Communities Green Tariff](https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/industries-and-topics/electrical-energy/demand-side-management/customer-generation/solar-in-disadvantaged-communities/the-disadvantaged-communities-green-tariff-dac-gt-program?ref=calregulatory.com) and [Community Solar Green Tariff](https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/industries-and-topics/electrical-energy/demand-side-management/customer-generation/solar-in-disadvantaged-communities/the-community-solar-green-tariff-csgt-program?ref=calregulatory.com) funding from GHG allowance proceeds to Public Purpose Program surcharge collections effective **July 1, 2026**; - Reduces the advice letter tier required for new Community Choice Aggregator DAC-GT programs from Tier 3 to Tier 2; and - Directs program administrators to transition reporting to [DGStats](https://www.californiadgstats.ca.gov/?ref=calregulatory.com) within 90 days of vendor notification that the platform is ready. **DAIS DISCUSSION:** Commissioners approved the decision 3-1, with President John Reynolds and Commissioners Karen Douglasand Christine Harada voting yes and Commissioner Darcie Houck voting no (Commissioner Baker was recused). - President Reynolds framed the decision as a ratepayer-protection measure. He contrasted competitively procured utility-scale solar with community renewable energy projects, which can receive administratively set compensation regardless of location, and said the pricing structure must ensure nonparticipating ratepayers do not pay more than the avoided-cost value of the electricity generated. - Commissioner Houck dissented, saying she still has objections to D.24-05-065 and that the loss of third-party funding made the program even less practical. She said the ReMAT-based compensation mechanism may not be practical, warned that pending legislation in Assembly Bill 18 could force additional changes, and said the CPUC was trying to “make a square peg fit into a round hole” by moving ahead with a program that lacks funding and has uncertain participation. - Commissioners Douglas and Harada supported the decision on ratepayer-protection grounds. Douglas said ReMAT was the appropriate foundation because it allows contracts of up to 20 years, compared with 12 years under the PURPA standard offer contract, and said statewide affordability concerns required the Commission to be “very rigorous” about limiting nonparticipant cost exposure. - Harada acknowledged that the decision would disappoint community solar advocates, but said the CPUC could not create a new subsidy or shift costs to other customers without external funding or legislative direction. She also emphasized that DGStats reporting will be important to determine whether the program produces participation, savings or project development. **INSTANT ANALYSIS:** This decision builds a tariff shell and waits for money that does not currently exist. The 3-1 vote reflected broad agreement that community solar has value, but not agreement that this structure is likely to work. Commissioner Houck’s dissent captured the practical problem: with the Solar for All award terminated, the state appropriation reverted, AB 18 pending, and ReMAT compensation unlikely to support new projects, the Commission may be setting up a program that remains mostly theoretical. The majority treated that problem as a legal and affordability constraint rather than a reason to stop. Every compensation structure that would make a community renewable energy project financeable was rejected as either a statutory violation or a matter requiring legislative action. Any CCA or Electric Service Provider may enter or exit the program at any time via Tier 1 advice letter, but participation in a program with no revenue support sufficient to attract project development is academic until external funding reappears. --- ### REMAT PROGRAM [Resolution E-5457](https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M608/K150/608150933.pdf?ref=calregulatory.com) updates fixed avoided-cost prices for the CPUC's Renewable Market Adjusting Tariff program, the feed-in tariff for renewable generators of 3 MW or less. The resolution adopts new ReMAT prices based on weighted-average Renewable Portfolio Standard contract prices from utility, Community Choice Aggregator and ESP contracts executed between 2020 and 2025 for projects of **20 MW** or less. The 2026 prices are as follows. - **$58.38/MWh** for as-available non-peaking; - **$67.40/MWh** for as-available peaking; and - **$92.33/MWh** for baseload. Against the 2025 figures, non-peaking rises from $52.85/MWh, peaking falls slightly from $67.99/MWh, and baseload increases from $75.96/MWh. PG&E, SCE and SDG&E must file Tier 1 advice letters within 30 days to amend their tariffs. Existing contracts are unaffected. The ReMAT program has produced 65 contracts totaling roughly 112 MW since inception, mostly small hydro and solar PV. Two contracts were executed in 2025\. **INSTANT ANALYSIS:** The baseload price jumps 21%, from $75.96/MWh to $92.33/MWh, driven by geothermal contracts dominating the baseload reference set. Non-peaking prices rise modestly. Peaking is essentially unchanged. In short, this is the administratively set avoided-cost rate catching up to a higher cost environment for small baseload renewables. The practical effect is limited by program scale. ReMAT has never been a volume story. But the resolution keeps a standardized procurement channel open for sub-3 MW projects and gives the utilities updated tariff prices without reopening PURPA or RPS policy skirmishes. The resolution changes nothing about actual program design. --- ### CORE TRANSPORT AGENTS [Resolution G-3621](https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M608/K566/608566014.pdf?ref=calregulatory.com) reaffirms the CPUC's 2026 annual fee structure for registered Core Transport Agents, keeping the base fee at **$5,000** while applying variable fees only to CTAs that generated consumer-protection costs in 2025. The methodology from [Resolution G-3597](https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M509/K545/509545115.PDF?ref=calregulatory.com) remains intact. Fixed administrative costs are spread across all 39 registered Core Transport Agents; variable costs are assigned by [Consumer Affairs Branch](https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/about-cpuc/divisions/news-and-public-information-office/consumer-affairs-branch?ref=calregulatory.com) complaints and [Utility Enforcement Branch](https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/regulatory-services/enforcement-and-citations/utility-enforcement-branch?ref=calregulatory.com) unauthorized-enrollment investigations and enforcement actions. Staff calculated 2025 fixed costs at **$212,491**, or **$5,449** per Core Transport Agent, within the 20% tolerance band. The base fee stays put. The complaint picture is worse. The Consumer Affairs Branch received 2,942 CTA-related complaints in 2025, up **75%** from 2024, including 2,067 phone contacts and 875 informal written complaints. For 2026, the CAB variable charge is **$5.94** per phone contact and **$189.52** per informal written complaint. Utility Enforcement Branch charges are **$680.43** per unauthorized-enrollment complaint and **$739.17** per enforcement action. The largest total fees fall on [Wave Energy](https://www.linkedin.com/company/wave-energy-llc/?ref=calregulatory.com), [SFE Energy](https://www.sfeenergy.com/?ref=calregulatory.com), [Big Tree Energy](https://www.bigtreeenergy.com/?ref=calregulatory.com), and United Energy Trading/[Callective Energy](https://callectiveenergy.com/about/?ref=calregulatory.com). **INSTANT ANALYSIS:** CTA-related complaints rose 75% in 2025, and unauthorized-enrollment complaints increased 88%. But total enforcement actions fell 83%, from 393 in 2024 to 65 in 2025, including a drop in citations from 387 to 55\. Four suppliers generated 52% of all complaints. The CPUC is not socializing those costs. The cost-causation design remains intact, and high-complaint CTAs pay substantially more than low-complaint ones.